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Abstract 
Many recent experimental studies have shown that some subjects destroy other 
subjects’ incomes without receiving any material benefit, and that they even incur 
costs to do so. In this paper, we study the boundary conditions of this phenomenon, 
which is referred to as anti-social behavior. We introduce a four-player destruction 
game, in which we vary the framing and the presence of another activity, running in 
parallel to the destruction game. We observe a substantial amount of destruction in 
the baseline condition without the parallel activity, and with a framing in the spirit of 
previous destruction experiments. Our results indicate that a parallel activity as well 
as a framing emphasizing joint ownership of the item that can be destroyed reduces 
destruction almost to zero. We therefore argue that the emergence of anti-social 
behavior is highly contingent on the contextual environment. 
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11. Introduction 
Standard-economic theory usually assumes that agents are rational and purely self-interested. 
The latter assumption implies that players in economic games only care about their own 
monetary payoffs, and especially not about the payoffs of other players. In the history of modern 
economics, the assumption of purely self-interested agents was virtually undisputed until the 
early waves of behavioral and experimental economics (for an overview, see Roth 1995).
Many laboratory experiments have shown that the behavior of human subjects deviates 
systematically from the predictions of standard economic theory: Subjects give money to the 
receiver in dictator games (Forsythe et al. 1994, Hoffman et al. 1994), they contribute voluntarily 
in public goods games (Fehr and Gächter 2000), and they trust and reciprocate in trust games 
(Berg et al. 1995). Many subsequent experiments and behavioral theories have focused 
extensively on the nature and implications of pro-social preferences (see e.g. Rabin 1993, Fehr 
and Schmidt 1999, and Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). In the context of these studies, a strong focus 
has been on the positive domain of other-regarding preferences: Individuals are willing to give 
up part of their own incomes to increase the income of others (as in the dictator game).  
Recently however, “anti-social preferences” (i.e. the negative domain of other-regarding 
preferences) have received the attention of experimental economics research as well. Several 
experimental studies (see for instance Abbink and Sadrieh 2009 or Zizzo and Oswald 2001) have 
shown that individuals are willing to destroy other individuals' income without obtaining any 
obvious material benefit for themselves – and are even incurring costs to do so.1
These results indicate that subjects deviating from purely self-interested behavior do not 
necessarily act exclusively pro-socially. Under certain circumstances, they also display anti-social 
behavior. This kind of behavior is often interpreted as representing some kind of "joy of 
destruction," and vandalism is named as a related example in the field.   
We are interested in two aspects of the previous experiments and the extent to which they 
have an impact on the observed anti-social behavior in the laboratory. First, in many of these 
experiments, the decision of whether to destroy other individuals' incomes or not is the only 
payoff-relevant decision (besides a real-effort task to generate income in the beginning of the 
experiment). The lack of a meaningful activity in parallel to the destruction decision might lead 
to boredom or an experimenter demand effect, and could be an important driver of the observed 
1 For a more detailed discussion of the relevant experiments, see section 2. 
2anti-social behavior. Second, most of the previous studies use a rather transactional framing, 
depicting the option to destroy income of other participants as a possibility to “buy destruction” 
(i.e. to pay a cost in order to reduce others’ incomes). This cost can be interpreted as the negative 
impact that the act of destruction has on the destroyer: In the context of real-world vandalism, 
doing damage to public property affects also the person destroying it (think of vandalism in trains, 
which leads to worse conditions of the trains and also higher costs for all passengers, due to 
higher maintenance costs). By emphasizing the joint ownership of this public property, it might 
therefore be possible to reduce the amount of destructive behavior – as potential offenders 
realize that they are destroying something that also belongs to them.  
The aim of our experiment is to understand the boundary conditions of anti-social behavior 
in the laboratory. In particular, we want to study the effects of boredom (or more precisely, the 
presence or absence of an alternative task) and framing on destructive behavior. For this 
purpose, we introduce a four-player game, which we call the Point Destruction Game, and we 
conduct it under different treatment conditions. The Point Destruction Game captures the most 
important elements of previous destruction games in the literature. Its new features, on the 
other hand, allow us to implement the treatment variations we are interested in. For these 
reasons, the baseline condition in our experiment is not an exact replication of one of the 
previous studies. It is, for instance, not possible to improve one’s relative position compared to 
other players through destruction (i.e. competitive preferences can be ruled out as the 
motivation for destructive behavior in our experiment). In section 5, we discuss similarities and 
differences between our experiment and previous destruction experiments, as well as 
implications for the interpretation of our results. 
As the first treatment variation, we introduce a parallel activity alongside the destruction 
game, in order to test whether this can reduce the amount of destruction. This seems particularly 
relevant in the context of related examples in the field as described in the psychological and 
sociological 2  literature (e.g. Csikszentmihalyi and Larson 1978 and Pani and Sagliaschi 2009), 
which generally identify boredom3 as an important driver of vandalism. 
2 For an economic example of the importance of a parallel activity, see Lei et al. (2001). They find that the size of a 
bubble in an experimental asset market can be dramatically reduced by introducing a parallel activity (in their 
experiment, the parallel activity is an additional market).
3 Our experimental design cannot disentangle whether boredom, experimenter demand (see Zizzo 2010 for a 
discussion), or subjects’ expectations to actively participate in the experiment (see Lei et al. 2001) is driving 
destruction in a setting without a parallel activity. We can only demonstrate that it is possible to reduce 
destructive behavior (or even to eliminate it almost completely) by introducing a parallel activity – indicating that 
3In the second treatment variation, we focus on the framing4 of the destruction game: In 
previous destruction experiments, the decision task is arguably framed with an emphasis on the 
possibility to destroy. The harm subjects cause to themselves is neutrally presented in form of 
money they have to pay for the destruction (i.e. as a cost). In order to analyze the effect of 
framing, we conduct the experiment using both a baseline framing in the spirit of previous 
experiments, and a joint framing that emphasizes the joint ownership of the item that is subject 
to destruction. In the baseline framing, subjects might perceive the situation as a market 
interaction, where destruction (i.e. reduction of others’ incomes) is a “good” that can be bought.5
Subjects might therefore pay less attention to the social aspects of the interaction – including the 
negative consequences for themselves, (i.e. destroying something that also belongs to 
themselves). In the joint framing, the emphasis lies on the joint ownership of the common 
property (which is subject to destruction). Thus, the negative consequences that destruction 
implies for the destroyer should be more salient, possibly leading to a lower level of destruction. 
By and large, we confirm our predictions in the experiment. The introduction of a parallel 
activity, as well as the joint framing, significantly reduce the amount of destructive behavior. We 
only observe significant amounts of destruction in the baseline treatment, which is framed with 
an emphasis on the possibility to destroy and lacks a parallel activity.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 gives a more detailed account 
of the relevant literature. In section 3 we describe the experimental design and derive 
hypotheses. Section 4 presents the results, and in section 5 we discuss differences and similarities 
to previous experimental studies, and their implication for the interpretation of our results. 
Finally, section 6 concludes. In appendix A we provide instructions, in appendix B screenshots, 
and in appendices C to E complementary tables, figures and analyses. 
anti-social behavior highly depends on the environment that individuals are facing. In our experimental design, 
we implement several features to minimize experimenter demand effects (see section 3.4). By additionally 
assuming that the (ideally low level of) experimenter demand should be comparable across treatment conditions , 
we think that the different levels of destruction should not be driven entirely by experimenter demand but to 
some extent also by boredom.
4 The impact of framing is well documented in the experimental l iterature, e.g. in the context of the prisoners' 
dilemma (Liberman et al. 2004) or the public goods game (Dufwenberg et al. 2011). 
5 See Liberman et al. (2004) for a discussion of the idea that the construal of a situation matters. 
42. Literature 
In this section, we give an overview of previous research that is relevant to our experiment. We 
review the experimental6 literature on anti-social behavior (in particular, the joy of destruction 
and money burning experiments), as well as the literature related to our treatment variations 
(the presence and absence of a parallel activity and framing). 
Generally speaking, individual behavior that has a negative impact on other individuals can have 
different motivations. From the perspective of economic theory, the most prominent one is 
presumably self-interest. In the experimental literature, there is plenty of evidence that some 
individuals are willing to harm others for their own benefit (e.g. Falk and Fischbacher 2002, 
Abbink et al. 2000, Cox et al. 2008, Fochmann et al. 2014). 
In this study, we are particularly interested in behavior that has a negative impact on the 
“victim” but offers no material benefit to the “offender.” Evidence for such behavior can be found 
in the literature on the measurement of social preferences (see Murphy and Ackermann 2012 for 
a literature survey). Even though the vast majority of subjects can be classified as either pro-
social or self-interested, a small fraction exhibit competitive preferences and are willing to give 
up part of their income in order to maximize the difference between their own income and the 
income of their counterpart (e.g. Charness and Rabin 2002, Froehlich et al. 1984, MacCrimmon 
and Messick 1976). 
Other examples providing evidence for anti-social behavior are (public goods) games with 
punishment opportunities. In contrast to altruistic punishment, which has been shown to be 
quite effective in enforcing norms of cooperation (see Fehr and Gächter 2002), anti-social 
punishment destroys existing norms and is hence harmful to all parties involved. Evidence for 
anti-social (third party) punishment can be found in the context of allocation decisions 
(Leibbrandt and López-Pérez 2011), but the most important examples are public good games 
with a decentralized punishment mechanism. In these games, punishment is targeted not only 
at free-riders, but also to some extent at full-contributors – with adverse effects on the overall 
level of cooperation (Bochet et al. 2006, Cinyabuguma et al. 2006, Herrmann et al. 2008). 
Moreover, the fear of counter-punishment can undermine the incentives for altruistic 
punishment, leading to low levels of cooperation (Denant-Boemont et al. 2007, Nikiforakis 2008). 
6 We focus here on the experimental l iterature, but there is also theoretical l iterature on anti -social and spiteful 
preferences (or behavior). See e.g. Saijo and Nakamura (1995), Dufwenberg and Güth (2000), Possajennikov 
(2000) or Hehenkamp et al. (2004).
5With multiple punishment stages, dynamics of retaliation7 can lead to feuds and vendettas 
(Nikiforakis and Engelmann 2011, Nikiforakis et al. 2012). Kamei and Putterman (2015) show that 
the effectiveness of higher-order punishment is highly sensitive to the institutional framework, 
i.e. to the exact design of the punishment mechanism.   
Most closely related to our experiment are joy of destruction games (see e.g., Abbink and 
Sadrieh 2009, Abbink and Herrmann 2011), and money burning games (e.g., Zizzo and Oswald 
2001, Zizzo 2002). In both of these games, subjects play in groups of two; they receive an initial 
endowment, and they can then destroy parts of the other player’s endowment. In the money 
burning games (Zizzo and Oswald 2001, Zizzo 2002, Zizzo 2003a, Zizzo 2003b, Dawes et al. 2007), 
the initial endowments are determined randomly, i.e. subjects might have different 
endowments. Subjects then have the possibility to “burn” the other subject’s money, i.e. to 
reduce the other player’s initial endowment, which incurs a cost to themselves. The results show 
that almost 50 percent of subjects decide to reduce the other player’s income. In most cases, this 
reduces inequality, i.e. the difference between the two players’ payoffs is reduced.8
In contrast to the money burning games, initial endowments are equal in the joy of 
destruction games.9  The reduction of inequality can therefore be ruled out as a motive for 
destructive behavior. Nonetheless, Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) observe substantial destruction 
rates. This result holds even if reducing others’ incomes has a cost (Abbink and Herrmann 2011), 
and also in unilateral destruction games (Kessler et al. 2012). A common observation is that 
destruction rates are higher in what are called “hidden” treatments (Abbink and Sadrieh 2009, 
Abbink and Herrmann 2011). In these treatments, part of the endowment is destroyed with a 
certain probability, irrespective of the actual destruction decision. This means that subjects who 
destroy can “hide” behind this random device, as the victim does not know whether the 
endowment was destroyed by the other subject or by the random device.  
Several qualitative and quantitative studies (most of them in the context of psychological 
and sociological literature) identify boredom as one of the underlying causes of vandalism, crime 
and violence (Csikszentmihalyi and Larson 1978, Farnworth 1998, Horowitz and Tobaly 2003, Pani 
7 Dynamics of retaliation can also be observed in vendetta games without a preceding public good game (Abbink 
and Herrmann 2009, Bolle et al. 2014).
8 Destruction does not always reduce inequality. In some cases, the player with the lower initial endowment also 
falls victim to destruction (Zizzo 2002, Abbink and Sadrieh 2009). 
9 In Abbink and Sadrieh (2009), initial endowments are only equal in expectation, but players are not informed 
about actual income differences.
6and Sagliaschi 2009). In experimental economics, boredom (more specifically the presence or 
absence of a parallel activity) has been studied in the context of asset market experiments. Lei et 
al. (2001) argue that bubbles in experimental asset markets can to some extent be explained by 
the fact that it is optimal not to trade at all in these markets, which might feel unnatural for some 
subjects (the active participation hypothesis). They show that the size of the bubble is 
dramatically reduced by introducing a parallel activity (in their case a second market in which 
trading is beneficial). Lugovskyy et al. (2010) use a similar argument to investigate overdissipation 
in all-pay-auctions. Instead of a parallel activity, they rescale the strategy space in order to test 
the active participation hypothesis. They find that rescaling the strategy space in such a way that 
zero is no longer the optimal bid significantly reduces the amount of overdissipation. The 
importance of the form of the choice set is also confirmed by Zhang and Ortmann (2013) for joy 
of destructions games. They show that fewer subjects behave destructively if there is an 
additional option for increasing the counterpart’s income, compared to a situation where only 
destruction is possible. Boredom, or the effect of a parallel activity, has to the best of our 
knowledge not yet been studied in the context of experiments on anti-social behavior.  
Framing can have large effects on behavior, as has been shown in many studies (most 
prominently Tversky and Kahnemann 1981). However, the effect of framing depends on the 
situation studied, and the effects of framing are clearer in risky decision making than in most 
other situations. Kuhberger (1998) describes a taxonomy of situations and their proneness to 
framing effects. For public good/bad situations, the literature on framing is abundant (e.g. 
Andreoni 1995, Brewer and Kramer 1986, Cookson 2000, Dufwenberg et al. 2011), but not very 
conclusive (for an overview, see Brandts and Schwieren 2007). Liberman et al. (2004) is relatively 
similar to our framing of the situations as either an individual decision task where destruction 
can be “bought” (i.e., a “market” for destruction) or as a joint possession that can be destroyed. 
In their study, participants play a prisoner's dilemma game either under the framing of a “Wall-
Street-Game” or as a “Community Game”, thus making different possible “construals” of the 
situation salient. The authors find a dramatic effect of this simple manipulation. The importance 
of framing, in particular with respect to the position of the initial allocation in the strategy space, 
has also been shown in the context of destruction games. Abbink et al. (2011) for instance show 
that reference points (i.e. whether anti-social behavior implies an actual act of destruction or 
rather refraining from a mutually beneficial action) influence subjects’ behavior patterns , for 
instance their reaction towards an exogenous variation of inequality.  In a similar study, Hoyer et 
al. (2014) vary the initial allocation in a fragile public good game, where subjects can either 
choose to be destructive or cooperative. They find that a positive framing, in the sense that the 
initial allocation is the worst outcome so that not being destructive is framed as contribution, 
7reduces destruction. A slight asymmetry, such that minimal destruction is individually optimal, 
on the other hand, increases destruction. In the context of anti-social behavior, we are not aware 
of any study that varies only the description of the game in the instructions – leaving everything 
else including the initial allocation constant.   
3. Experimental Design 
In the following section we describe the design and implementation of our experiment. We first 
introduce the Point Destruction Game, which is a four-player, real-time destruction game. It 
comprises important features of the joy of destruction and money burning games used in 
previous experiments, but also new features that are necessary to study our main research 
questions. After describing the game, we explain the two treatment variations designed to 
investigate possible effects of a parallel activity and framing. Finally, we describe the experimental 
procedure and the course of events within the laboratory.
Our experiment consists of two parts 10 : The first part is the Point Destruction Game 
combined with a real-effort task. The second part consists of two individual decision making tasks 
(a risky investment task and the Holt and Laury 2002 risk elicitation task). We are primarily 
interested in the first part of the experiment. The second part was mainly implemented to avoid 
experimenter demand effects (a more detailed description of part two can be found in section 
3.4, and a short summary of the results in appendix C). 
3.1 The Point Destruction Game
At the beginning of part one of the experiment, subjects are randomly assigned to groups of four 
and receive an initial endowment of 36 ET (experimental tokens). On each subject’s computer 
screen, 36 rhombs (“points” henceforward) are displayed, each of them representing a value of 
one ET. The act of destroying income is implemented by giving subjects the possibility to delete 
these points by clicking on them. When a subject clicks on a point, the point immediately 
disappears from the subject’s screen, as well as from the screens of all other members of the 
group. The deletion of a point reduces the income of all other group members as well as the 
10 Subjects were informed that the experiment consisted of two parts  and that the money earned in the first part 
of the experiment would serve as their endowment for the second part of the experiment (see the beginning of 
the instructions, Appendix A).
8subject’s own income by one ET. In other words, the cost to reduce the income of each of the 
three other group members by one ET equals one ET. Reducing income is only possible as long as 
there are points left on the screen.11
The Point Destruction Game is divided into three phases, each lasting three minutes. Each new 
phase is a continuation of the previous phase, i.e. the number of points and the arrangement of 
deleted and non-deleted points on the screen at the beginning of a new phase are identical to 
the final arrangement of the previous phase. The group composition remains unchanged for all 
three phases of the Point Destruction Game.
The final payoff of the Point Destruction Game is the initial endowment of 36 ET minus the 
total number of deleted points over all phases in the respective group. This is equivalent to the 
number of points remaining on the subject’s screen at the end of the Point Destruction Game. 
The final payoff of the Point Destruction Game is  therefore identical for all members of one 
group. 
3.2 Treatment variation 1: framing
Our first treatment variation refers to the phrasing of the instructions for the Point Destruction 
Game. In the previous literature on anti-social behavior, the destruction task is usually presented 
as the choice of whether or not to destroy parts of the other player’s income at a cost to oneself. 
The negative consequences of the act of destruction for the destroyer are framed as a price that 
has to be paid. In the baseline condition, we use this type of framing – adapted for the context of 
the Point Destruction Game: The instructions state that subjects have an endowment of 36 ET 
and that they can reduce the income of all other members of their group by one ET which is 
connected with a cost of one ET.12
11 Note that in our design, destruction is only possible as long as there are points left on the screen. Assuming the 
(extreme) case that one subject immediately deletes all  36 points in the beginning of phase one, the other 
subjects would have no opportunity to destroy. It would have been possible to avoid this issue by l imiting the 
number of points one subject can destroy (e.g. to the tota l number of points divided by the number of subjects 
in one group). We decided against this, however, as this would have restricted us in the formulation of the joint 
framing and contradicts the idea of joint ownership. If all  points are destroyed in one group, the amount of 
observed destruction can be seen as a lower bound of the true level of destruction. As we are not interested in 
the absolute level of destruction but rather in treatment differences this does not conflict with the interpretation 
of our results.
12 See appendix A for the entire set of instructions.
9In order to investigate the impact of this particular framing, and to check whether it is 
possible to reduce the amount of destruction by using a different framing, we implement a 
second version of the instructions as a treatment variation. 
As the deletion of a point reduces the payoff of the subject who deletes it by one ET, the 
act of destruction implies a negative payoff consequence for this subject. In the baseline framing 
presented above, this negative payoff consequence is presented as a cost. In the joint framing, 
however, this negative payoff consequence is described indirectly, as a negative consequence for 
all group members (including the subject who deletes the point). The deletion of a point is thus 
described as an action that can be taken that negatively influences everyone in the group 
(including the subject taking the action): The instructions state that each point represents a value 
of one ET for all members of the group, that points can be deleted by clicking on them, and that 
none of the group members (“neither you nor the other members of your group”) receives a 
payoff for a deleted point. The instructions conclude with an explanation that each group 
member receives a payoff of one ET for each remaining point at the end of the experiment. 
We interpret the second framing as a “joint” framing because the points are presented as 
a symbol representing the same value for all group members. We therefore expect the framing 
to induce an awareness of joint ownership in the sense that subjects realize that the points belong 
to all group members (including themselves) and that the destruction of a point harms all group 
members, in particular also themselves. Our treatment variation does not introduce some form 
of group identity, e.g. in the spirit of Chen and Li (2009); the only difference between the joint 
framing and the destruction framing is the description of the Point Destruction Game in the 
instructions. 
Note that reducing the income of the other group members by one ET at a cost of one ET 
is equivalent to reducing all group members’ incomes (including the subject’s own income) by 
one ET. Therefore, the structure of the game as well as the resulting payoffs are identical in both 
treatments. The only variation is the framing of the instructions. 
3.3 Treatment variation 2: parallel activity
The second treatment variation involves whether the Point Destruction Game takes place in 
parallel to another activity. In most of the previous experiments on anti-social behavior, the 
decision of whether or not to destroy parts of the other players’ incomes is the only decision that 
is taken at this stage of the experiment.
10
We want to identify whether this has an impact on the observed level of anti-social 
behavior. Subjects therefore not only play the Point Destruction Game, but also participate in 
three real-effort tasks – depending on the treatment condition either in parallel to or between 
the three phases of the Point Destruction Game (see Table 1). In the real-effort part, subjects 
receive payment for correctly solved exercises. In phase one, the task is to count the frequency 
of a certain letter in a row of different letters. In phase two, subjects have to multiply two natural 
numbers (between 10 and 20), and in the third phase they have to add two natural numbers  
(between 100 and 999). Screenshots of the three different tasks and their description in the 
instruction can be found in appendices A and B. For each correctly solved task, subjects receive 
a payoff of one ET, while wrong answers have no impact on the payoff. Note that the payoff 
earned in the real-effort tasks is independent of the payoff in the Point Destruction Game. The 
total payoff earned in part one is the sum of the final payoff in the Point Destruction Game and 
the accumulated payoff during the real-effort tasks, which is determined by the total number of 
correctly solved exercises over all three real-effort tasks. 
Table 1: Treament conditions and timing with and without parallel activity
Time
Treatment conditions …
Time
… without parallel activity … with parallel activity
3 min. real-effort task 1
real-effort task 1 & PDG (phase 1) 3 min.
3 min. PDG (phase 1)
3 min. real-effort task 2
real-effort task 2 & PDG (phase 2) 3 min.
3 min. PDG (phase 2)
3 min. real-effort task 3
real-effort task 3 & PDG (phase 3) 3 min.
3 min. PDG (phase 3) 
Note: The abbrevation PDG denotes the Point Destruction Game.
Depending on the treatment condition, subjects play the Point Destruction Game either in 
parallel to the real-effort tasks (henceforward “treatment conditions with parallel activity”) or 
between the real-effort tasks (“treatment conditions without parallel activity”). In the treatment 
conditions with parallel activity, the first part of the experiment consists of three phases each 
11
lasting three minutes. In each phase, the Point Destruction Game and the real-effort tasks take 
place in parallel: The 36 points are displayed as a frame at the edge of the screen; the exercises 
as well as the input field for the real-effort task are shown in the middle of the screen (for a 
screenshot, see appendix B, figure B.1). In the treatment conditions without parallel activity, the 
first part of the experiment is divided into six phases each lasting three minutes. Subjects work 
on the real-effort task for three minutes (without points at the edge of the screen) and afterwards  
play the Point Destruction Game for three minutes (without a real-effort task in parallel). The 
points are thereby displayed on a screen between the real-effort tasks, which indicates that the 
previous task has finished and that the next task will start soon (see appendix B, figure B.2). This 
sequence is repeated three times: as in the treatment with parallel activity, subjects participate 
in all three phases of the real-effort tasks and they play the Point Destruction Game for nine 
minutes in total (divided into three phases each lasting three minutes).  
The amount of time subjects spend for the Point Destruction Game as well as the real -effort 
tasks by itself is equal in the treatments with and without parallel activity (nine minutes divided 
into three phases of three minutes each). Nonetheless, the total time spent for the Point 
Destruction Game and the real-effort tasks amounts to nine minutes in the treatments with 
parallel activity and eighteen minutes in the treatments without parallel activity. Given that in 
some treatments the Point Destruction Game and the real-effort tasks take place in parallel and 
in some others sequentially, it is impossible to keep the length of time constant in all 
dimensions.13
Another issue in the treatment conditions with parallel activity is the fact that destruction 
might be associated with an opportunity cost. Assuming that a subject is not able to solve 
exercises while deleting points, the act of destruction has a negative impact on his earnings from 
the real-effort part.14  In practice, this opportunity cost of destruction turns out to be small 
enough that we think it can be neglected without challenging our results . It takes less than a 
13 Keeping the total time for the Point Destruction Game and real -effort tasks constant would require a reduction 
of the time available for the Point Destruction Game and the real -effort task individually. It would be possible to 
equalize the overall  time in both treatments by introducing a three minutes waiting phase in the treatments with 
parallel activity. Sti l l , the time available for PDG and real-effort tasks would differ. More importantly, the 
implementation of such a waiting phase would seem fairly artificial and probably create boredom and frustration, 
which might influence later destruction activities .
14 A simple way to avoid this issue would have been to introduce a non-payoff-relevant parallel activity. However, 
also in case of a non-payoff relevant parallel activity, there might be an implicit opportunity cost of destruction if 
the parallel activity is to some extent joyful. If the parallel activity was neither joyful nor payoff-relevant, it is not 
clear why subjects should engage in the activity at all .
12
second to move the cursor to the point and to click on it. The analysis of subjects ’ performance 
in the real-effort part shows that they need on average 18 seconds to solve one task. Given that 
the payoff for a correctly solved task is one ET, the opportunity costs of destruction should be 
negligible. 
3.4 Part two of the experiment
As mentioned before, our experiment consists of two parts. The first part is the Point Destruction 
Game and the real-effort tasks. The second part consists of two individual decision tasks. For the 
first task, subjects have to decide on how much of the money earned in part one to invest in a 
risky lottery. With a probability of p = ½ the lottery pays 2.5 times the amount invested and zero 
otherwise (we borrow this task from Gneezy and Potters 1997 taking the parameters used in 
Charness and Gneezy 2010). Hence, the final payoff after the investment task is the sum of the 
amount not invested plus the payment of the lottery. The second individual decision task is  the 
risk elicitation task proposed by Holt and Laury (2002) with ten paired lottery choices (see 
appendix B for a detailed description of the task and for a screenshot).
Note that we are not particularly interested in subjects’ risk preferences or in the relation 
between anti-social behavior and risk.  The main reason for implementing the second part of the 
experiment is to avoid experimenter demand effects. As the earnings of part one are used as 
endowment for part two, subjects could reason that a purpose of the real-effort tasks is to 
generate an endowment for the individual decision tasks.  In particular, we want to avoid that 
the only payoff-relevant decision subjects are facing (besides the real-effort tasks) is whether or 
not to reduce others’ incomes (as this could potentially lead to an experimenter demand effect, 
see Zizzo 2010). A short summary of the results of the second part can be found in appendix C. 
3.5 Summary of the treatment conditions and hypotheses
Table 2 summarizes the experimental design and the four treatment conditions. We use a 
between-subject 2 x 2 factorial design and label the treatment conditions as follows: BASE 
(baseline condition, i.e. no parallel activity and no joint framing), PARALLEL (with parallel activity 
but no joint framing), JOINT (joint framing, without parallel activity) and JOINT-PARALLEL (joint 
framing, with a parallel activity).  
Based on the destruction rates observed in previous experiments (see section 2), we expect 
a positive amount of destruction in the baseline condition, which is in terms of the framing and 
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the presence of a parallel activity most closely related to previous destruction experiments .15
Regarding our first treatment variation, we expect the joint framing to make subjects aware of 
the joint ownership of the object of destruction and to emphasize the negative consequences 
destruction implies for themselves. In the baseline framing however, the act of destruction is 
described rather as a market interaction (i.e. pay something to reduce others’ income) in which 
the negative consequences should not be as salient as with the joint framing. We therefore 
expect a lower level of destruction in the treatment conditions with the joint framing  (i.e.  JOINT 
and JOINT-PARALLEL) compared to the treatment conditions with the baseline framing in the 
spirit of previous destruction experiments (i.e. BASE and PARALELL).  
Table 2: Treatment variations
Activity in parallel to the destruction decision
No Yes
Joint framing
No BASEn = 56
PARALLEL
n = 44
Yes JOINTn = 44
JOINT-PARALLEL
n = 52
Notes: Activity in parallel to the destruction decision implies that subjects play the Point Destruction 
Game in parallel to the real-effort tasks. No activity in parallel to the destruction decision implies
that the Point Destruction Game and the real -effort tasks take place sequentially (see section 3.3). 
For a detailed description of the framing, see section 3.2. 
With respect to our second treatment variation, we expect a lower level of destruction in the 
treatments with parallel activity (i.e. PARALLEL and JOINT-PARALLEL) compared to the 
treatments without parallel activity (i.e. BASE and JOINT). This hypothesis is based on two related 
mechanisms: First, subjects might get bored in the treatments without parallel activity and 
therefore engage in destructive behavior (as mentioned before, there is evidence in the 
sociological and psychological literature that boredom is an important driver of destructive 
15 Note that a rational and strictly self-interested subject has no reason to destroy a point. Standard-economic 
theory would therefore predict no destruction in all  four treatment conditions .
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behavior, see Csikszentmihalyi and Larson 1978, Horowitz and Tobaly 2003). Second, subjects 
might have the expectation to actively participate in all relevant parts of the experiment (see Lei 
et al. 2001) and find it unnatural to look at the points for three minutes without taking any action. 
Our experimental design cannot distinguish between these two mechanisms; it can however 
show that destructive behavior is not necessarily related to spiteful preferences or a preference 
for destruction, but also depends on the circumstances and can be highly malleable. 
3.6 Experimental procedures
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and conducted in sixteen sessions 
in the experimental laboratories at the Universities of Heidelberg and Mannheim (eight sessions 
in Heidelberg and eight in Mannheim).16 The number of subjects participating in each session 
varied between eight and sixteen.
Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2015), and no subject participated in more 
than one session. All subjects within one session were confronted with the same treatment 
condition. In total, 196 subjects (mostly undergraduate students with various majors from the 
Universities of Heidelberg and Mannheim) participated in our experiment.17 Each of the four 
treatment conditions was conducted at both locations (for an overview, see appendix D).  On 
average, one session lasted about one hour and subjects earned €15.71 (Standard deviation 5.13, 
minimum 4.83, maximum 32.40).  
In the beginning of the experiment, subjects were seated randomly and received written 
instructions explaining the procedures of the experiment (see appendix A). Subjects were 
informed about the course of events and that the money earned in the first part would be used 
as their endowment in the second part of the experiment. For the first part (the Point Destruction 
Game and the real-effort tasks), subjects were randomly assigned to groups of four. Subjects 
knew that the second part would involve only individual decision-making and that there would 
be no groups.  
The payoffs in the Point Destruction Game, the real-effort tasks as well as the investment 
tasks were presented in Experimental Tokens (ET). The exchange rate between ET and Euro was 
16 The two cities are located at a distance of roughly 20 km apart. We conducted the experiment in two different 
laboratories to have access to a larger subject pool. 
17 104 subjects participated in Heidelberg (59 male, 45 female) and 92 in Mannheim (43 male, 49 female).
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1 ET = €0.10.18 The payoffs in the Holt and Laury (2002) risk task were presented in Euro. At the 
end of the experiment, subjects privately received their payment in cash (including a show-up 
fee of €2). 
4. Results 
In the following section we present the results of the experiment and describe the respective 
statistical analyses. The section is organized as follows: First, we analyze treatment dif ferences 
with respect to destruction on the group level. Second, we look at individual destruction decisions 
and analyze the number of points destroyed by a particular subject, as well as the distribution of 
destroyed points per group. Finally, we conduct a regression analysis to control for socio-
demographic characteristics, performance in the real-effort tasks, and negative reciprocity on the 
group level.
4.1 Aggregate destruction on the group level
Figure 1 shows the aggregate destruction rates for each treatment, i.e. the percentage of points 
destroyed per treatment. To calculate the destruction rate for a given group, we divide the total 
number of destroyed points at the end of the Point Destruction Game by the total number of 
points that are initially present, i.e. 36. To obtain the aggregate destruction rates presented in 
Figure 1, we take the average over all groups in a given treatment. Note that it is difficult to 
compare these aggregate destruction rates to destruction rates in previous experiments , as our 
destruction rates are defined on the group level. This implies for instance that a single group 
member can drive the destruction rate for their group up to 100 percent – even if the remaining 
three group members do not engage in destruction. 
In the baseline condition (BASE) without a parallel activity and with a framing in the spirit 
of previous destruction experiments, we observe a high level of destruction (33.1 percent). In 
eight out of fourteen groups more than one point is destroyed; in three of these groups all 36 
points are destroyed by the end of the Point Destruction Game. 
18 The exchange rate between euro and U.S. dollar was around €1 = $1.25 at the time when the experiment was 
conducted.
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Figure 1: Percentage of destroyed points by treatment condition
The destruction rates in the remaining three treatments are substantially lower and lie 
between 0.8 and 3.0 percent. In JOINT, there is not a single group in which more than one point 
is destroyed. In PARALLEL as well as PARALLEL-JOINT we observe only one group in which more 
than one point is destroyed (in both of these groups, all destruction is caused by a single subject). 
We conduct Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests to assess whether the differences between 
treatment conditions are statistically significant. We find evidence that the destruction rates 
observed in BASE are significantly higher than in JOINT (p = 0.017) and in PARALLEL (p = 0.007). 
However, the differences between PARALLEL and JOINT-PARALLEL, as well as between JOINT and 
JOINT-PARALLEL, are not significant (p = 0.075 and p = 0.306).19 This can be explained by the fact 
that the level of destruction in JOINT is already so low (almost zero) that no additional effect is 
possible when adding the parallel activity (the same holds for PARALLEL and adding the joint 
framing).  
19 The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test assumes that the two distributions being tested are identical except for a shift. 
As this assumption might be violated (in particular with experimental data) we perform two additional tests as a 
robustness check: First, the robust rank order test (see Fligner and Policello 1981) that assumes neither equal 
variances, nor equal shape of the distributions. Second, the test for stochastic inequality (see Schlag 2008) that 
makes no distributional assumptions. The presented test results (as well as those in the next subsection) are all  
robust to using one of these two tests instead of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. The detailed results of all  
tests can be found in appendix D.
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Overall, we can conclude that, as expected, the introduction of a parallel activity as well as 
the joint framing reduce the amount of observed destruction significantly (compared to the 
baseline condition). 
4.2 Destruction at the individual level
In the previous analysis, we examined the total number of points destroyed in a given group. In 
the next step, we investigate how many subjects of a given group engage in destructive behavior. 
Figure 2 displays the overall share of subjects who destroy exactly one point (in light grey) and 
the share of subjects who destroy more than one point (in dark grey) for each treatment 
condition.20
Figure 2: Subjects who destroy one point vs. more than one point
20 Recall  that subjects are matched in groups of four and that every group member has the possibility to destroy 
any of the displayed points. If a subject clicks on a point, the point disappears immediately from the screens of 
all  four group members. It is nonetheless possible that two subjects click on the same point at the exact same 
time. Even though this is highly unlikely (as both subjects have to click on the same point at the exact same 
moment), this happened twice in our experiment. Both subjects could not realize this incident (they both clicked 
on the point and the point disappeared, and the final payoff was not affected). In the analysis, we proceed as 
follows: On the aggregate level (Figure 1), we count one destroyed point; on the individual level (Figure 2), we 
count one destroyed point for each of the two subjects (both subjects intended to destroy the point and from 
their perspective the intended destruction happened – including the payoff consequences). Note that our results 
do not change qualitatively when we proceed differently.
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In BASE we observe that a substantial share (23.2 percent of the subjects) destroy more 
than one point. In JOINT however, not a single subject destroys more than one point, and in 
PARALLEL and JOINT-PARALLEL only one subject destroys more than one point. In all treatments  
conditions besides JOINT, we observe a certain number of subjects (between 6.8 and 10.7 
percent) who destroy exactly one point. In the analysis, we distinguish between subjects who 
destroy exactly one point and subjects who destroy more than one point. Subjects who destroy 
exactly one point might do that out of curiosity, to observe what actually happens if they click on 
the point. We therefore check whether the number of subjects who destroy more than one point 
significantly varies between treatment conditions. As we cannot treat individual destruction 
decisions as independent observations, we calculate the number of subjects who destroy more 
than one point for each group, and take this as an independent observation. 
According to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, we find significant differences between 
BASE and JOINT (p = 0.008), as well as between BASE and PARALLEL (p = 0.026), but not between 
PARALLEL and JOINT-PARALLEL (p = 0.904), or between JOINT and JOINT-PARALLEL (p = 0.358). 
This is plausible as the number of subjects destroying more than one point is already quite low 
in the JOINT and PARALLEL treatments, with the result that the second treatment variation has 
no additional impact.  
4.3 Regression analysis
Table 3 presents the results from an OLS regression. The dependent variable is the number of 
points destroyed by a subject over all three phases of the Point Destruction Game. The first two 
lines show that the parallel activity as well as the joint framing significantly reduce the amount of 
destruction. Note that the overall effect of both treatment variations is significant even though, 
according to the non-parametric test, it is significant only in comparison with the baseline 
treatment. The significant interaction term shows, in line with the non-parametric tests, that the 
negative effect of the parallel activity on the amount of destruction is weaker in the presence of 
the joint framing (and vice versa that the effect of the joint framing is weaker in the presence of 
the parallel activity). 
The fourth line shows that the number of correctly solved exercises in the real-effort tasks 
has no effect on the number of points destroyed by a subject. This observation is consistent with 
the claim that the opportunity cost of destruction should be negligible. Ideally, we would want to 
conduct this analysis particularly for the treatment conditions with a parallel activity. However, 
this is difficult, as there is almost no destruction in these treatment conditions.
19
Table 3: Regression coefficients (ordinary least squares estimates)
Dep. Variable Number of destroyed points
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
1 PARALLEL -1.34** -1.21** -1.95** -1.49**
2 JOINT -1.43** -1.57** -2.13** -1.53**
3 PARALLEL x JOINT - - 1.94** 1.39**
4 # correctly solves tasks (RET) - - -0.03 -0.03
5 # points destroyed by others - - 0.08** -
6 Dummy destruction by others - - - 2.95**
7 Intercept 2.33*** 3.38** 3.93** 3.46**
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 196 196 196 196
AIC 5.402 5.419 5.399 5.364
Notes: Table 3 shows regression coefficients from an OLS regression. The dependent variable is the 
number of points destroyed by a subject over all three phases of the Point Destruction Game. PARALLEL 
and JOINT are dummies indicating the main treatments (see Table 2). # correctly solves tasks (RET) is the 
total number of correctly solved exercises in the three the real-effort tasks. # points destroyed by others
is the total number of points destroyed by the other three group members. Dummy destruction by 
others = 1 if in total more than one point was destroyed by the other group members, and =0 if one or 
zero points were destroyed by the other group members. Controls “Yes” indicates that the regression 
includes gender, age and field of study. Standard errors are clustered at the group level.
The fifth line shows that the number of points destroyed by the other members in the group  
has a positive effect on a subject’s own likelihood to destroy.21 This observation is somewhat in 
line with the broken windows theory (Wilson and Kelling 1982) stating that the occurrence of 
destructive behavior depends on whether the surrounding is in good condition or not, i.e. 
whether destruction has already happened beforehand or not. Note, however, that this result 
refers to the overall number of points destroyed. We do not record dynamics of destruction 
21 Note that the maximum value of the dependent variable (number of points destroyed by a subject) depends on 
the number of points destroyed by the other members of the group. This could potentially lead to problems in  
the third specification (C), where the number of point destroyed by the others is one of the independent 
variables. We therefore include an additional specification (D) where we replace the continuous variable by a 
dummy variable that takes the value one if more than one point was destroyed by other members of the group.
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within a group; it is therefore difficult to make statements about how exactly destructive 
behavior of one subject influences the destructive behavior of the other group members. 
Therefore, and as we are primarily interested in the impact of our treatment variations on 
destructive behavior, this result should be seen as a side note. 
5. Discussion  
When setting up a new experiment, certain design choices have to be made, which could often 
have been made differently as well. In this study, we aim at understanding the boundary 
conditions of anti-social behavior, by testing alternative explanations for findings in the literature 
on anti-social preferences. Design-choices are therefore especially important. In the following, 
we discuss the choices we made (in particular, aspects in which our experiments deviates from 
previous studies) and in what way they affected the results and their interpretation. 
5.1 Symmetric payoff structure
In our design, the cost-destruction ratio is 1:3, i.e., subjects have to pay one ET to reduce the 
income of three others by one ET each. In contrast to most of the previous experiments, 
destruction is equally distributed amongst the other group members , such that payoffs after the 
act of destruction are symmetric (everyone's payoff is reduced by one ET). It is therefore not 
possible to improve one’s relative position towards others by destroying others’ income. This 
symmetric payoff structure is crucial for implementing the treatment variation to study the effect 
of framing. With a cost-destruction ratio that implies a higher disutility for the victim of 
destruction than for the subject who destroys, we would not be able to implement a joint framing 
emphasizing the joint ownership of the good to be destroyed. Moreover, this aspect of joint 
ownership characterizes many of the field examples this research relates to, e.g. vandalism: The 
destruction of a common property, which is owned jointly by the community members, hurts the 
destroyer to the same extent as everyone else. In the case of an asymmetric cost-destruction ratio 
it is more plausible that the good is owned solely by the victim of destruction, resulting in a higher 
disutility from destruction for her than for the destroyer. 22  An additional advantage of the 
22 A concrete example from the field would be malicious scratching of cars. Here, the disutil ity of the scratching is 
clearly higher for the car owner than for the scratcher (in this case the disutil ity of the scratcher is rather indirect, 
e.g. the probability of being caught or having a guilty conscience). Considering the destruction of common 
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symmetric setup is that destruction cannot be driven by competitive preferences. Hence, the 
amount of destruction we observe in our experiment points rather to joy of destruction than to 
spite.
5.2 Observation without delay
In our experiment, destruction can be observed without delay. When a subject clicks on a point, 
the point immediately disappears from the screen of the other group members as well. This 
allows for negative reciprocity, i.e. subjects can react to observed destructive behavior by being 
destructive themselves. This could lead to a higher amount of destruction compared to a situation 
in which subjects decide whether or not to destroy or not without knowing the decisions of the 
other players. As the goal of our study is not to provide evidence for high levels of destruction 
but to show that destruction can be reduced by our treatment variations, we want to provide the 
best possible conditions for the occurrence of destruction. 
This feature of the Point Destruction Game points to the question of how individuals react 
when they observe destructions by other individuals. We find some evidence for negative 
reciprocity as suggested by the broken window theory (Wilson and Kelling 1982), indicating that 
subjects destroy more if their group members engage in destruction as well. As this question is 
not the focus of our paper, and as we do not track the timing of individual destruction, we cannot 
see whether there is some kind of upward spiral as observed in Abbink and Herrmann (2009). The 
fact that the coefficient “# points destroyed by others” is significant in the regression suggests 
that some of the destruction might be driven by group dynamics, but we have no clear evidence 
for this, nor do we have evidence on how destruction later comes to a halt. A more systematic 
investigation of this issue would be an interesting focus for further research.
5.3 Destruction in form of an actual activity
Another aspect that differs from previous experiments is that the act of destruction is connected 
to an actual activity (clicking on the point) and has a physical effect (the point disappears). In most 
property (e.g. park benches, bus stops, youth clubs, etc.), the symmetric cost-destruction ratio seems more 
plausible. 
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previous studies, subjects just stated a number, i.e. by how much they want to reduce their 
counterpart's income.23
Our implementation of destruction is, first, necessary to introduce it in the context of a 
parallel activity, allowing subjects to play the Point Destruction Game while participating in the 
real-effort task at the same time. Second, it is a potentially more intuitive way of implementing 
the possibility to destroy than just stating a number. It might even allow for a small “joy of 
destruction” experience, like in the field example: An act of vandalism is usually connected to the 
activity of destruction (e.g. smashing the glass panel at a bus stop), which might be experienced 
as pleasant, and could be motivation enough for destruction without actually having the objective 
to harm others. This could (among other factors) explain the relatively high destruction rate we 
observe in our BASE treatment compared to previous studies. 
One might wonder whether having two parallel tasks induces cognitive load. We do not 
expect this to be the case, for two reasons. We do not explicitly ask subjects to do two tasks at 
the same time, and there is no explicit time pressure – both of which are necessary conditions 
for cognitive load to influence behavior. 
5.4 Open vs. hidden treatments
Several of the previous studies on anti-social behavior distinguish between open and hidden 
treatments. Abbink and Herrmann (2011), for instance, implement a hidden treatment with a 
random mechanism, which destroys part of the other player’s income with a known probability, 
irrespective of the subject’s decision on whether or not to destroy. Furthermore, the subject who 
was victim of destruction does not learn whether his income has been destroyed by the other 
player or by the random mechanism. The authors hypothesize that the destroyer could “hide” 
behind this random mechanism, arguing that the money would have been destroyed with some 
probability anyway. Indeed, the observed destruction rate in the hidden treatment is significantly 
higher than in the open treatment without the random mechanism. 
In our design, destruction only happens if subjects decide to destroy (i.e. there is no random 
mechanism implemented). However, subjects cannot identify who of their group members was 
responsible for the deletion of points. Subjects who have destroyed a point can therefore “hide” 
23 It is therefore theoretically possible that some subjects click the point just out of curiosity , to find out what 
happens if they do. In the analysis, we therefore distinguish between subjects who destroy exactly one point and 
those who destroy more than one point. See section 4.2 for details.
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behind the other group members in the sense that the point might have been destroyed by one 
of the other group members as well.
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we introduced a novel four-player destruction game – the Point Destruction Game 
– to study the boundary conditions of anti-social behavior in the laboratory. We used this game 
to analyze two aspects: the framing of the destruction game and the presence of an alternative 
task during the destruction decision. In order to study these aspects, we had to make several 
modifications compared to previous destruction experiments (as discussed in the previous 
section). These modifications, however, do not challenge the interpretation of our result, as they 
apply to all of our treatment conditions and hence cannot explain the treatment differences we 
observe. 
In the baseline condition without parallel activity and with a framing that describes the 
negative consequences for the destroyer as a cost, we observe a substantial amount of 
destruction (33.1 percent of all points are destroyed). In all other treatments, destruction 
disappears almost completely (destruction rates between 0.8 and 3.0 percent), which implies 
that the joint framing (emphasizing the joint ownership of the points) as well as the activity in 
parallel to the destruction game can significantly reduce anti-social behavior. A substantial 
amount of the anti-social behavior observed in the baseline condition can therefore be attributed 
to the specific framing and the lack of a parallel activity. 
These results might not come as a surprise to practitioners in the field of social work, where 
boredom or the lack of a meaningful activity is known to be an important driver of destructive 
and violent behavior. In addition, the argument, often used by kindergarten teachers, that 
children should not destroy a community toy, as this implies that they cannot play with it later 
themselves, relates to some extent to our framing variation.  
Nonetheless, we think that the results of our experiment have important implications for 
the general interpretation of anti-social behavior. Our results suggest that anti-social behavior 
observed in the laboratory is not necessarily driven exclusively by spiteful or anti-social 
preferences, but is to some extent also influenced by the contextual environment individuals are 
facing. The most important implication of this finding is  that anti-social behavior is not something 
we have to live with, but is something that can be prevented by providing individuals with the 
appropriate institutional environment.    
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Appendix A – Instructions
(Original instructions were in German. They are available from the authors upon request.) 
 
Information about the procedures of the experiment. Welcome to this experiment and thank you 
for your participation! The following instructions explain the rules and the procedures of the 
experiment. In this experiment, you can earn real money. You will receive €2 for arriving on time 
for the experiment. Any further earnings depend on your decisions and answers , and to some 
extent on the decisions of the other participants. 
Every participant has received the same instructions as you. Please take your time to read these 
instructions carefully. 
No communication with other participants. Throughout the entire experiment, you are not 
allowed to communicate with other participants. Please switch off your mobile phone now and 
store it together with any other personal items out of your reach underneath the table. To ensure 
a smooth progress of the experiment, you are not allowed to engage in any activity not related 
to the experiment. Please focus exclusively on the experiment. If you do not comply with these 
rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment. In this case, you will not receive any 
payment.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. Please do not shout out your question. The 
experimenter will come to your desk and answer your questions privately. 
Procedures. The experiment is divided into three parts.24 The instructions for experiment 1 are 
already on your desk. You will receive the instructions for experiment 2 and 3 once experiment 1
has been completed. During experiment 1, you will be divided into groups of four participants. 
Experiments 2 and 3 are individual decision making tasks (no groups). During the experiment, 
payments are always stated in the experimental currency “Experimentaltaler” (ET). At the end of 
the experiment, ETs are converted into Euro in the following exchange rate: 1 ET = € 0.10. 
The end of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will learn how much you earned in 
total. Please remain seated until the number of your computer is called. You can then come to 
the counter and collect your earnings. Please leave all instructions on your desk and take your 
personal items with you when you leave. 
24 In the description of the experimental design (see section 3), we refer to experiment 1 as “part one” and to 
experiment 2 and 3 as “part two.”
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Instructions: Experiment 1
[JOINT and PARALLEL-JOINT: Experiment 1 consists of three rounds.]
You are in a group with three other participants in the laboratory. Participants have been 
randomly assigned to groups. The groups will remain completely anonymous, i.e., you will never 
learn who the other members of your group are. 
[BASE and PARALLEL] At the beginning of experiment 1, you will receive an endowment of 36 ET. 
You can reduce the payoff of all other members of your group. To reduce the payoff of the other 
group members by one ET each, you need to click on a point at the edge of your screen. This costs 
you one ET. The point then immediately disappears from your screen and from the screens of all 
other members of your group. You can click all the points, no points at all, or any number in 
between. The payoff of the other members of your group is reduced accordingly (by 1 ET per 
point). Please note that after all the points have disappeared, it is no longer possible to reduce 
the income of the other group members. All other members of your group have the same options  
as you. 
[JOINT and PARALLEL-JOINT] In [PARALLEL-JOINT: between] every round, you will see 36 points at 
the edge of your screen. Each point has a value of 1 ET for you and all other members of your 
group. You have the possibility to delete points by clicking on them. If you click on a point, it 
disappears from your screen and from the screens of all other members of your group. You can 
click all the points, no points at all, or any number in between. For a deleted point, neither you 
nor any other member of your group receives any payment. For all remaining points that are not 
deleted at the end of experiment 1, you and each member of your group receives 1 ET. 
Independent of that, [BASE and PARALLEL: experiment 1 consists of three rounds.] [Y]ou can earn 
money in each round by solving tasks on the computer. Each round lasts 3 minutes, and in each 
round you may solve as many tasks as you can. For each correctly solved task, you receive 1 ET. If 
you solve a task incorrectly, it has no effect on your payoff, i.e., only correctly solved tasks count. 
You can find the exact description of the three different types of tasks (counting letters, 
multiplication, and addition) in a separate instruction. 
The aforementioned points appear between [PARALLEL and PARALLEL-JOINT: during] the rounds. 
They are independent of the tasks in the rounds, i.e., the constellation of points appears without 
changes again after [PARALLEL and PARALLEL-JOINT: in] the next round. 
[PARALLEL and PARALLEL-JOINT] The above-mentioned points appear during the rounds, but they 
are not influenced by the rounds, i.e., the constellation of points appears again after each round, 
without changes. 
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The ETs you have earned in experiment 1 serve as the initial endowment for experiment 2. The 
instructions for experiment 2 will be distributed after experiment 1. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand! The experimenter will come to your desk and 
answer your questions privately. 
Tasks in experiment 1
Task 1: Counting letters: In task 1, you have to count how often a specific letter occurs in a row of 
letters. Each task has the following form: 
Please count how often the following letter appears in the row below: o                                                                              
Row of letters: obooboobobobbboobobobobbbboooboboobbboobbbbobbobob
You need to carefully go through the row of letters and count how often the letter o appears. The 
correct answer in this example would be 23.
Task 2: Multiplication: In task 2, you have to multiply two numbers:
Please calculate the product of 17 and 13
The correct answer in this example would be 221. 
Task 3: Addition: In task 3, you have to add two numbers:
Please calculate the sum of 578 and 187
The correct answer in this example would be 765. 
Please insert your result in the appropriate field and press “OK.” The next task will then appear 
on your screen. In addition, the number of tasks you have already worked on will be displayed in 
each round. Please note that you may not use pencil and paper!
Instructions: Experiment 2
Experiment 2 consists of an individual decision task. The endowment at the beginning of 
experiment 2 is the amount of money you earned in experiment 1. You already saw the amount 
of money on the previous screen, and it will be displayed again when you make your decision. 
You have to decide how much of your income (between 0 to 100 percent) you want to invest in a 
lottery. You may keep the non-invested share in any case. 
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The lottery: With a probability of 50%, your investment is a success. In this case, you receive 2.5 
times the money you invested as payoff from the lottery. If the investment is not successful, you 
lose the amount invested, i.e., the payoff from the lottery is zero. 
Your total payoff after experiment 2 is thus the sum of the part you did not invest and the payoff 
from the lottery. 
Instructions: Experiment 3
You will see the instructions for experiment 3 on your computer screen after experiment 2 has 
finished. 
Experiment 3 is independent of experiments 1 and 2. The payoff from experiment 3 will be added 
to the payoff after experiment 2. 
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Appendix B – Screenshots
Figure B1: Screenshot phase one in PARALLEL and PARALLEL-JOINT
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Figure B2: Screenshot phase one in BASE and JOINT
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Figure B3: Screenshot Task 1 in BASE and JOINT
36
Figure B4:  Screenshot of the Holt and Laury (2002) risk elicitation task (second task in the second part of the experiement)
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Appendix C – Results risk tasks (2nd part of the experiment)
As mentioned in section 3, our experiment consists of two parts. The first part is the Point 
Destruction Game and the real-effort tasks (as described in section 3.1 - 3.3). The second part 
consists of two individual risk elicitation tasks. 
Recall that we are not specifically interested in subjects’ risk preferences or in the 
relationship between anti-social behavior and risk preferences. The main reason for 
implementing the second part of the experiment is to avoid experimenter demand effects. As the 
earnings of part one are used as the endowment for part two, subjects could reason that the 
purpose of the real-effort tasks is to generate an endowment for the individual decision tasks in 
part two. By including a second part, we avoid a situation where the only payoff-relevant decision 
(other than the real-effort tasks) is whether or not to reduce others’ incomes, which could 
potentially lead to an experimenter demand effect, see Zizzo (2010).
In the first task, subjects have to decide how much of the money earned in part one they 
are willing to invest in a risky lottery. This lottery pays 2.5 times the amount invested with a 
probability of p = ½, and zero otherwise. We borrow this task from Gneezy and Potters (1997), 
taking the parameter values from Charness and Gneezy (2010). The final payoff after the 
investment task is the sum of the amount not invested in the lottery plus the payoff from the 
lottery. 
In the experiment, subjects invest on average 36.3 percent of their endowments. A small 
number of subjects (4.0 percent) invest nothing, while 9.2 percent of subjects invest their entire 
endowments. The mean investments in the four treatment conditions are relatively close to the 
overall mean investment and they are not significantly different from each other (with one 
exception: in BASE, the mean investment is higher than in PARALLEL and this difference is 
marginally significant). 
The second individual decision task is  the risk elicitation task proposed by Holt and Laury 
(2002), comprising ten paired lottery choices (see appendix B, figure B4 for a screenshot). 
Subjects have to make ten decisions (row 1 – row 10) between two lotteries that are labelled 
“option A” and “option B.”  Option A is always the lottery with the lower variance (the two possible 
outcomes are €1.60 and €2.00), and is therefore the safer option. Option B is always the lottery 
with the higher variance (here the two possible outcomes are €0.10 and €3.85), and therefore 
the riskier option.  For the first decision (row 1), the probability of receiving the higher payoff in 
both lotteries is 0.1, hence the probability of receiving the lower payoff is 0.9. The probability of 
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receiving the higher payoff increases by 0.1 per row, up to row 10, where the probability for 
receiving the higher payoff is one. 
A rational subject should switch exactly once from choosing option A to option B, i.e. they 
should not choose option A if they have chosen option B in a previous row. In the experiment, 
92.9 percent of subjects follow this pattern and switch only once from option A to option B.  
In row 10, every subject should choose option B, as this guarantees a certain payoff of 
€3.85, which is higher than the certain payoff of €2.00 resulting from option A. The vast majority 
of subjects choose accordingly, and only eight subjects (4.2 percent) choose option A in the last 
row. 
A subject’s degree of risk aversion can be estimated by the row in which they switch from 
option A to option B. The later the subject switches from option A to option B, the higher the 
degree of risk aversion. Note that a risk neutral subject should switch to option B in row 5, as this 
is the first row in which the expected payoff of option B is higher than the expected payoff of 
option A. 
In the experiment, the mean switching point (restricted to the 182 consistent choices  with 
a unique switching point) is 6.5, indicating that our subjects are, on average, slightly risk averse. 
As expected, the share of the endowment invested in the investment task is negatively correlated 
to the switching point (Pearson correlation coefficient of -0.166, p ≤ 0.05). The mean switching 
points in the four treatment conditions are relatively close to and not significantly different from 
each other (with one exception: in BASE, the switching point is significantly higher than in 
PARALLEL). 
39
Appendix D – Detailed test results, summary of experimental sessions
Table D1: Detailed test results
Impact of joint framing Impact of a parallel activity 
Without 
parallel 
activity
With 
parallel  
activity 
With   
baseline 
framing 
With             
joint      
framing
BASE 
vs . 
JOINT
PARALLEL 
vs . 
JOINT-PARALLEL
BASE  
vs .
PARALLEL
JOINT
vs . 
JOINT-PARALLEL
Number of destroyed points per group (group level) –section 4.1
Empirical z-values       
(Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test)
2.398** -1.779* 2.722*** -1.024
Empirical Û-values (Robust 
rank order test) 2.533** -1.403* 2.765*** -0.861
Stochastic difference
(Test for stochastic 
inequality)
-0.5260** 0.3427 -0.5714** 0.2098
Number of subjects that destroyed more than one point (individual level) –section 4.2
Empirical z-values       
(Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test)
2.666*** 0.121 2.221** -0.920
Empirical Û-values (Robust 
rank order test) 2.318** 0.055 1.984** -0.309
Stochastic difference
(Test for stochastic 
inequality)
-0.5000** -0.0140 -0.4351** 0.0769
Note: Positive numbers indicate that the value of the variable is larger in the treatment condition named first, 
and vice versa for negative values. * p ≤ 0.1;   ** p ≤ 0.05;  *** p ≤ 0.01
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Table D2: Summary of the experimental sessions
Activity in parallel to the destruction decision
No Yes
Joint 
framing
No
BASE
56 subjects in 14 groups
7 groups in Heidelberg
7 groups in Mannheim
Average earnings: €8.9
PARALLEL
44 subject in 11 groups
4 groups in Heidelberg
7 groups in Mannheim
Average earnings: €10.4
Yes
JOINT
44 subjects in 11 groups
7 groups in Heidelberg
4 groups in Mannheim
Average earnings: €11.8
JOINT-PARALLEL
52 subjects in 13 groups
8 groups in Heidelberg
5 groups in Mannheim
Average earnings: €10.1
Notes: For a detailed description of the treatment variations, see section 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5 (in particular, Table 2) 
